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A WOMAN SOLDIER’S RIGHT TO COMBAT:
EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE MILITARY
TIM BAKKEN*
INTRODUCTION: DE JURE DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY
II. THE COMBAT-EXCLUSION OF WOMAN SOLDIERS
III. THE BOUNDARY OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TOWARD THE MILITARY
CONCLUSION: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF A COMBAT-EXCLUSION POLICY
FOR WOMEN
INTRODUCTION: DE JURE DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY
Through federal policy and its own rules and culture, the U.S.
military has been, and to some extent remains, especially in regard
to women, the last government institution accepting of de jure dis-
crimination.1 Over the past several years, this policy has been eroded,
first with Congress’s decision in 2010 to reverse itself and allow gays
and lesbians to serve openly in the military.2 Then, in 2013, the
Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, effectively
allowing same-sex marriages.3 The military had no choice but to
provide gay and lesbian soldiers the unlimited right to military ser-
vice and, for married homosexual soldiers, rights and benefits that
are equal to those available to married heterosexual couples.4
However, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has acted to
ensure that women have the right to hold all jobs in the military for
which they are qualified. Most prominently, the military prohibited
all women from serving in combat units.5 But, in January of 2013, the
* Professor of Law, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York 10996. (M) (212)
877-0587; (O) (845) 938-5544. Tim-Bakken@usma.edu; Tim.Bakken@outlook.com.
1. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE REVIEW OF LAWS POLICIES AND
REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE SERVICE OF FEMALE MEMBERS IN THE U.S. ARMED
FORCES, at i (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/wisr_report_to_congress
.pdf [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS].
2. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ321/pdf/PLAW-111publ321.pdf.
3. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
4. Leo Shane III, DOD Announces Full Benefits to Married Same-Sex Couples, STARS
AND STRIPES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/us/dod-announces-full-benefits
-to-married-same-sex-couples-1.235284.
5. Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary
of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments (Jan. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/WISRJointMemo.pdf [hereinafter Department of Defense,
Elimination] (declaring the elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and
Assignment Role).
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military lifted its blanket exclusion of women from combat.6 Nonethe-
less, the military reserved for its commanders the continued right to
exclude women from combat if the commanders could assert a partic-
ular military necessity as a justification.7 The justification that con-
tinues to be asserted is one based on the physical differences between
men and women.8 Thus, because it is unlikely that military rules
will provide equal opportunity to women unless higher law mandates
it, this Article focuses on women soldiers’ Equal Protection rights to all
jobs in the military, especially in the combat arms branches.
The combat opportunities for women soldiers might not be as
numerous or attainable as recent events and media reports seem to
indicate. Despite progress, women soldiers should remember the
Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution and not rely only on
military commanders’ discretionary decisions for equal opportunity.9
On January 24, 2013, a Department of Defense press release headline
read, Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role.10 Not
indicating the full integration of women, the headline was more accu-
rate than the headlines of prominent news outlets. A New York Times
headline read, Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for Women.11 A
Reuters headline read, Pentagon Lifts Ban on Women in Combat.12 A
U.S. News headline read, ‘Valor Knows No Gender’: Pentagon Lifts
Ban on Women in Combat.13 The responses to these media outlets’
headlines should be “not yet, not completely, and maybe a long time
from now.”
As the Defense Department’s headline read, a women’s right to
combat has been expanded, but it is not a stable right, and the right
is not complete. The new rule provides broad discretion for the mili-
tary to exclude women from combat upon a sufficient factual basis,
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i–ii.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing equal protection for individuals in their rela-
tions with the federal government in the Due Process Clause); see also Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (affirming the “due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution” and the federal government’s duty to respect that protection).
10. Claudette Roulo, Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role, DEP’T OF
DEFENSE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119098.
11. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/us/pentagon-says
-it-is-lifting-ban-on-women-in-combat.html?pagewanted=all.
12. Phil Stewart & David Alexander, Pentagon Lifts Ban on Women in Combat,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/us-usa-military-women
-pentagon-idUSBRE90N0SI20130124.
13. Erin McClam, ‘Valor Knows No Gender’: Pentagon Lifts Ban on Women in Combat,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/24/16681072-valor
-knows-no-gender-pentagon-lifts-ban-on-women-in-combat?lite.
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which is not defined.14 Given the hidebound culture of the military,
tradition often prevails over law because with its vast discretion the
military will define law to permit a preordained result.15 In effect,
the military qualifies every rule with “depending on mission needs,”
which converts law, if military rules can be called that, into the dis-
cretionary decisions of military commanders.16
Less than a month after the Pentagon announced the new rule,
the Commandant of the Marines explained vaguely why women could
be excluded from the infantry, the largest combat unit:
I think there is absolutely no reason to think our females can’t be
tankers, or be amtrackers, or be artillery Marines . . . . The in-
fantry is different . . . . You could reach the point where you say
“[the integration of women soldiers is] not worth it” . . . . The num-
bers [of qualified women] are so infinitesimally small, it’s not
worth it.17
In one respect, the commandant has a point if the qualification for a
combat unit is defined narrowly, such as performance on a physical
fitness test. One physical fitness test for all soldiers might result in
only a relatively few women qualifying for combat.
However, the commandant’s argument that a uniform physical
fitness test would not be “worth it,” presumably on a cost-benefit
basis, has been faulty and dated for many years. The Army’s basic
physical fitness test for all soldiers, male and female, already per-
mits women to perform fewer pushups and sit-ups and to run a two-
mile course more slowly than men to qualify for duty.18 Even among
men, the test permits older soldiers to remain on duty by performing
at a lower level than younger soldiers.19 The Army permits an older
14. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
15. Chris Madsen, Military Justice, the Anglo-American Tradition, OXFORD BIBLI-
OGRAPHIES, available at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199
791279/obo-9780199791279-0045.xml?print.
16. Id.
17. James Dao, In Arduous Officer Course, Women Offer Clues to Their Future in
Infantry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/us/marines
-look-to-infantry-course-for-insight-on-women.html?ref=us.
18. See Male Pushup Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), http://usarmybasic.com/army
-physical-fitness/male-pushup-standards; Male Situp Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013),
http://usarmybasic.com/army-physical-fitness/male-situp-standards; Male 2 Mile Run
Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), http://usarmybasic.com/army-physical-fitness/male-2-mile
-run-standards; Female Pushup Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), http://usarmybasic.com
/army-physical-fitness/female-pushup-standards; Female Situp Standards, U.S. ARMY
(2013), http://usarmybasic.com/army-physical-fitness/female-situp-standards; Female 2
Mile Run Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), http://usarmybasic.com/army-physical-fitness
/female-2-mile-run-standards.
19. Male Pushup Standards, supra note 18; Male Situp Standards, supra note 18;
Male 2 Mile Run Standards, supra note 18.
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male soldier to complete fewer pushups and sit-ups and run the two-
mile course more slowly than a younger male soldier and still receive
the same score.20 To illustrate, to qualify for the maximum number
of points on pushups, a male soldier in the twenty-seven to thirty-one
age range must do seventy-seven pushups in two minutes, but a male
soldier in the forty-two to forty-six age range must do only sixty-six.21
For female soldiers to qualify for the maximum number of pushup
points, in the twenty-seven to thirty-one age range they must do fifty
pushups, and in the forty-two to forty-six range female soldiers must
do thirty-seven pushups in two minutes.22
In response to the commandant, a colonel in the Army argues
that the physical fitness test used by the military should be modi-
fied to emphasize endurance over strength and that tests for combat
inclusion should be broadened to include non-physical qualifications,
such as emotional strength.23 The author uses Audie Murphy as an
example.24 He was the most decorated soldier in U.S. history.25 But,
during World War II, the Marines and Army paratroopers rejected
him for his physical stature, five feet, five inches and 120 pounds.26
The colonel found wanting the military’s size and strength justifica-
tion to exclude women from combat.27 During the Vietnam War, the
Vietnamese soldiers were five inches shorter and fifty pounds lighter
than United States soldiers.28
The colonel concluded that the problem with “our current em-
phasis on physical strength is that it celebrates the use of violence at
the expense of other methods of gaining power and influence.” 29 To
illustrate, she uses the example of a commander in Iraq in 2003 who
ordered the soldiers in his unit to backpedal and take a knee when
approached by an angry group of Iraqis.30 The commander put his
open hand over his heart to indicate the Islamic gesture “peace be with
you.” 31 There was no fight or violence, but “this act of courage . . . did
not garner awards and widespread recognition in the military.” 32
20. Id.
21. Male Pushup Standards, supra note 18.
22. Female Pushup Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), http://usarmybasic.com/army-physical
-fitness/female-pushup-standards.
23. Ellen Haring, Women and the Audie Murphy Model, ARMED FORCES JOURNAL (Aug.
2013), http://armedforcesjournal.com/article/2013/08/14067070.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Haring, supra note 23.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Through the new policy, the Pentagon has preserved its right to
exclude women and, in the meantime, has preserved its autonomy and
broad discretion by effectively deflating any congressional impetus
to legislate on the matter of women in combat. Thus, this Article dis-
cusses why women soldiers should not avert their eyes from consti-
tutional challenges to their exclusion from jobs within the military.
Although through its expansive deference-to-the-military jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court has largely prevented all soldiers from
using the Constitution to question military policies, women soldiers
should nevertheless continue to assert Equal Protection claims if
they expect to obtain jobs based on their individual qualifications.33
On January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff signed a Memorandum whose title promised
more than it gave: “Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Role.” 34 The media and commentators
interpreted this to mean the elimination of the ban on women serv-
ing in combat.35 This interpretation is not correct.
The Pentagon Memorandum did rescind the presumption that
women may not serve in combat, but it preserved the authority of the
military to continue “to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed
to women” if the exclusion is “narrowly tailored, and based on a rigor-
ous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills and abil-
ities needed for the position.” 36 Since then, one member of Congress
questioned whether the inclusion of women in combat units would in-
crease the number of sexual assaults in the military.37 While the num-
ber of sexual assaults in the military is significant, about 26,000 in
2012, it seems that a better remedy to the problem than eliminating
opportunities for potential women victims would be to focus on pre-
venting assailants’ from assaulting women.38 The culture of exclusion
33. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (holding that women have
an equal protection right to equal opportunities); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 240 (1989) (holding that female gender must be irrelevant in employment decisions
due to equal protection).
34. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5; Stewart & Alexander, supra
note 12; McClam, supra note 13.
35. Bumiller & Shanker, supra note 11.
36. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
37. Anna Mulrine, Women in Combat No Later than 2016, Pentagon Says, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (July 25, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0725
/Women-in-combat-no-later-than-2016-Pentagon-says.
38. Jennifer Steinhauer, Sexual Assaults in Military Raise Alarm in Washington,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/pentagon-study
-sees-sharp-rise-in-sexual-assaults.html?pagewanted=all. But see DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 3 (Vol. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY12_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report
_on_Sexual_Assault-VOLUME_ONE.pdf.
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in the military will not erode quickly. One 2013 book details what
the author believes will be the implications of women in combat.39
Titled Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into
Combat, the book’s online summary concludes:
But there is no evidence women are clamoring for ground com-
bat assignments. Worse yet, there is significant reason to believe
that women in combat will lead to a wide range of devastating
consequences, many unforeseen and unintended by proponents,
but no less dangerous.40
Especially in the military, a new rule will not soon change an old
culture. The military receives a vast amount of deference from the
courts, and the “occupational specialty” exception in the Memorandum
provides a clear basis for continued exclusion.41 Less than a year be-
fore the new rule, the Department of Defense, in February 2012, had
reinforced the old rule, excluding women from combat.42 The Pentagon
reported to Congress that it would continue its formal, de jure policy
of excluding women from combat units.43 The 2012 Pentagon Report
reinforced its exclusion policy despite a report a year earlier by the
Military Leadership Diversity Commission, created by Congress, find-
ing that the bar against women in combat should be lifted.44
But, in its February 2012 announcement, based on a brief, lightly
reasoned summary, the Pentagon said that it would permit women
to serve in units that supported combat operations but continue a
policy of excluding women from traditional combat units, such as
infantry, armor, and reconnaissance and special operations.45 In ef-
fect, the “new” Pentagon policy, in 2012, provided no real benefit to
women soldiers because they had already been functionally serving
in combat support units for years, given the needs created by the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.46 Serving in combat “support-related
jobs” offers far less career advancement than serving in combat
39. ROBERT L. MAGINNIS, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES: HOW COWARDS ARE PUSHING WOMEN
INTO COMBAT 99–100 (2013) (listing as examples an increase in sexual assaults, physical
suffering, and subjecting women to the draft).
40. Robert L. Maginnis, Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women
into Combat, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Deadly-Consequences-Cowards-Pushing
-Combat/dp/1621571904/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top#.
41. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
42. Id.
43. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i, 16.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon Allows Women Closer to Combat, but Not Close
Enough for Some, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/us
/pentagon-to-loosen-restrictions-on-women-in-combat.html.
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units, such as infantry, artillery, and special forces, because promo-
tion in the military to higher ranks often depends on having served
in a combat unit.47
Sounding the kind of rationale used in the past to exclude from
the military persons who were black or homosexual, a Marine Cap-
tain responded to the 2012 Pentagon policy, which continued the
combat exclusion:
I think the infantry in me will have a very hard time ever accept-
ing that I’m going to rush against the enemy and there’s going
to be a female right next to me. . . . Can she do it? Some might.
I don’t know if this sounds bad, but I kind of look at everything
through my wife. Is that my wife’s job? No. My job is to make sure
my wife is safe.48
Pervasive within the military, such stereotypical thinking is what the
Supreme Court rejected in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in 1989, as
a rationale for treating women differently in the workplace.49 Yet, as
discussed in this Article, the Court has found that the military is a
separate society.50 “This [Supreme] Court has long recognized that
the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civil-
ian society.” 51 It possesses the right, uniformly and with little scru-
tiny, to discriminate to ensure “good order and discipline.” 52
Such reasoning exists at the highest levels of the Pentagon.
On the day she introduced the revised combat-exclusion policy, in
February of 2012, Vee Penrod, the Deputy Assistant Under Secre-
tary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, was asked how the
Pentagon knew, from the previous 1994 policy, that women could
not meet the physical demands of combat.53 She said that the 1994
ruling was “based on experience with the leadership and experience
in combat.” 54 The Pentagon relies on such peremptory reasoning
and has never offered any empirical evidence for excluding women
from combat.55 Taking into consideration such old presumptions and
47. See James Dao, Servicewomen File Suit Over Direct Combat Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/us/servicewomen-file-suit-over-direct
-combat-ban.html?_r=0 (“In the Army, the suit says, 80 percent of general officers come
from combat arms positions, which women are barred from holding.”).
48. Id.
49. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
50. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 734.
53. Bumiller, supra note 46.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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stereotyping, and in applying the United States v. Virginia exceed-
ingly persuasive standard, which the government must satisfy to sus-
tain sex or gender discrimination, the conclusion in this Article is that
the military’s combat exclusion policy is not consistent with concepts
of equality or Equal Protection.56 The only way the combat-exclusion
policy could be saved constitutionally would be if the Supreme Court
continued to provide extreme deference to military judgment, even
where the military infringes significantly on fundamental rights. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court’s extreme deference policy toward military
judgment is obsolete.
The January 2013 Pentagon policy provided that women need not
be integrated into combat units until 2016.57 The Pentagon retained
the right to permanently keep an occupational specialty or unit “closed
to women” if the Pentagon can assert a sufficient factual basis.58 Such
relatively broad authority, which the Defense Department has granted
to itself, will continue to permit arbitrary exclusion policies. The ex-
treme deference that courts have for the military means that judicial
review of even de jure exclusion policies in the military will be rare,
and the basis for excluding women from combat in the future will
probably be similar to the slim basis for excluding them in the past,
with a narrow focus on physical strength.59
The 2012 combat-exclusion policy was not new, and it was not
neutral even in regard to an examination of physical ability.60 The
2012 policy contained what it called a “vision statement,” which read:
“[t]he Department of Defense is committed to removing all barriers
that would prevent Service members from rising to the highest level
of responsibility that their talents and capabilities warrant.” 61 That
vision statement was so broad as to be meaningless; nobody believes
that there should be barriers that prevent anyone from rising based
on her or his “talents and capabilities.” The 2013 policy is narrower,
allowing combat exclusion if the exclusion is “narrowly tailored, and
based on a rigorous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge,
skills and abilities needed for the position.” 62 Still, if the new policy
were not premised on stereotypical thinking, one would expect a
more neutral statement, such as “every soldier, male and female,
may serve in combat if he or she meets the prescribed mental and
physical standards.” 63
56. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
57. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
58. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at i.
62. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5, at 2.
63. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i.
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Apart from a general physical fitness test for all soldiers and
some specialized unit tests for only men, the Pentagon has not tested
soldiers to determine their capability for combat.64 It has simply in-
cluded men and excluded women.65 The 2012 Pentagon Report con-
tained virtually the only remaining federal or state policy of de jure
discrimination against women:
DoD policy prohibits women from assignment to units below the
brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat
on the ground. The direct ground combat assignment exclusion
prohibits the assignment of women to ground combat units below
the brigade level . . . .[P]ositions at the battalion level of direct
ground combat units, in select occupational specialties . . . [are]
open to women. These positions . . . do not include occupational
specialties closed to women, such as infantry.66
The 2013 policy limits the instances when women can be excluded,
but it does not provide for a neutral basis on which to exclude all
soldiers, male and female, who are unfit for combat.
Although women may routinely serve in combat support branches,
the 2013 Pentagon policy thus retains a modified exclusion rationale
for women who want to serve in combat units (armor, artillery, in-
fantry, and special forces).67 The Army is the largest military ser-
vice.68 More general officers come from Infantry than from any other
branch.69 Women comprise only thirteen percent of the Army.70 Facing
exclusion from Infantry and the other combat branches, from which
a large proportion of the remaining generals advance, women will nec-
essarily comprise a far lower percentage of top positions in the Army
than their percentage (thirteen percent) in the Army population.71
Congress has not acted with any urgency in opposition to the
Pentagon’s combat exclusion policy. For instance, “Congress has
repeatedly balked at allowing women in combat and has in recent
years asked the Pentagon sometimes sharp questions when it be-
came obvious through news reports that women were serving in com-
bat in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 72 In 1980, Congress opposed President
Jimmy Carter’s recommendation that women be required to register
64. APFT Standards, U.S. ARMY (2013), available at http://usarmybasic.com/army
-physical-fitness/apft-standards.
65. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id.
70. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Bumiller, supra note 46.
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for the selective service.73 Instead, Congress limited registration to
“every male citizen [of the United States] . . . between the ages of 18
and 26.” 74
In Rostker v. Goldberg, the statute limiting draft registration to
males was challenged by a male registrant who claimed that the stat-
ute violated the Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution.75
In upholding the statute, in 1981, the Supreme Court found that
“Congress concluded that [women] would not be needed in the event
of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them . . . . [W]e con-
clude that Congress acted well within its constitutional authority
when it authorized the registration of men, and not women, under
the Military Selective Service Act.” 76 Finding no Equal Protection
violation in Rostker, the Court has similarly concluded that Congress
and the military have broad authority to regulate military affairs,
even where that means providing military personnel with limited con-
stitutional protections.77
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court, spurred by Associate
Justice William Rehnquist, began a policy of extreme deference toward
the military.78 The Court’s deference was at its zenith when any in-
dividual attacked a statute concerning the military, such as the draft
registration statute in Rostker.79 In requiring only men to register
for the draft in Rostker, the Court refused to disapprove what was,
and continues to be, de jure discrimination.80 In other instances, the
Executive Branch has acted alone to restrict the rights of military
personnel. In Parker v. Levy, the Army prohibited an officer from mak-
ing negative comments about the Vietnam War.81 The Court upheld
the officer’s criminal conviction and three-year prison sentence as
punishment for his expression (arguing against the war).82 Had he
not been in the military, his speech would have had the utmost First
Amendment protection.83
73. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 453 (1981).
75. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 63.
76. Id. at 77, 83.
77. Id. at 57, 64–67.
78. See id. at 59.
79. Id. at 83.
80. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
81. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding a conviction under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice where an Army officer tried to dissuade soldiers from going to Vietnam).
82. Id. at 760–61.
83. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
408 (1989) (holding that the government may not prohibit political speech unless the
speech tends to cause immediate violence).
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The Constitution, mainly in Article II, provides the President
with express authority in only several instances, such as in regard to
vetoing bills or pardoning persons convicted of crimes.84 Even though
in regard to his control over the military the President has only
Commander-in-Chief authority, a vague power, the Supreme Court
has deferred to the military’s treatment of its individual soldiers.85
Usually, when acting alone with only implied power, Executive au-
thority can be limited by congressional action.86 When acting with
implied authority, which is often, the President’s authority depends
on whether Congress has concurred, demurred, or remained silent.
The constitutional structure behind determining the extent of the
President’s authority was constructed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer, in 1952, through Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion.87
Justice Jackson wrote:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied autho-
rization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it in-
cludes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he
be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sover-
eignty . . . . When the President acts in absence of either a con-
gressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain . . . . When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control
in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject.88
In Youngstown, the Court was not clear as to whether it believed Con-
gress had disapproved or remained silent about President Truman’s
attempt to take over the steel mills. Regardless, the Court concluded
that President Truman did not have adequate implied authority in
the absence of congressional approval to expropriate the steel mills,
even for the benefit of the U.S. war effort in Korea.89 As in Youngstown
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
85. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
86. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–39 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 635–38.
89. Id. at 588.
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Steel, regarding an Executive policy, the Pentagon’s combat-exclusion
policy is an Executive Branch rule.90 For women soldiers, the best
reading of the circumstances surrounding the 2013 Pentagon rule
(abolishing the blanket exclusion of women from combat units) is
that Congress remained silent.91 Given that in Rostker the Court
upheld a statute limiting draft registration to men, it seems more
likely that today’s Court would find that Congress is more support-
ive of women outside, rather than in, combat.92 Such a reading means
that a woman soldier is wholly dependent on Pentagon policy for her
job opportunities.
The Constitution expressly delegates authority over military af-
fairs to Congress and, to a lesser extent, the President as Commander-
in-Chief.93 Article I provides that Congress shall have the power to
“raise and support Armies,” “make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” “provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,” and “provide for organiz-
ing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.” 94
A female soldier could argue that Articles I and II concern the struc-
ture controlling the military, but not the individual rights of soldiers
within the military. She could argue that there is nothing in the
Constitution to indicate soldiers are not entitled to Bill of Rights’
protections. The first ten amendments were ratified in 1791, after
the ratification of Article I in 1789.
The Fifth Amendment is the only Amendment that enumerates
a limit on a soldier’s civil rights.95 Given this express limitation, all sol-
diers could argue that they are entitled to all the remaining protec-
tions contained within the Bill of Rights, specifically Amendments I,
II, IV, V, VI, and VIII. The Fifth Amendment provides that a soldier
is not entitled to a grand jury indictment before being accused of a
crime: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.” 96
But even this provision leaves open the possibility that a soldier is
90. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
91. Id.
92. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1981).
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
94. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; id. cl. 14; id. cl. 15; id. cl. 16.
95. Id. amend. V.
96. U.S. CONST. amend V (emphasis added).
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entitled to an indictment when there is no war or public danger. In
the Fifth Amendment, there is no other limitation on soldiers’ rights.97
Significantly, the Fifth Amendment includes the due process clause,
which, under Bolling v. Sharpe, encompasses the federal Equal Pro-
tection clause, the provision on which a female soldier would rely in
a claim against any policy that prohibited her from combat.98
The only other amendment that references soldiers is the Third
Amendment. It provides that “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time
of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” 99 None of the other
amendments, specifically those that implicate expressive and religious
freedom and criminal cases (Amendments I, IV, V, VI, and VIII), has
any exception or limitation for a specific person. From this, it may be
argued that because only the Fifth Amendment contained an excep-
tion disadvantageous to soldiers (no grand jury indictment required)
that the other amendments, including the Equal Protection clause in
the Fifth Amendment, apply equally to soldiers and non-soldiers.
Article II makes the President “Commander in Chief,” but it
contains no express authority for the President to limit the rights of
soldiers.100 Still, the Supreme Court seems uncomfortable reviewing
military matters and, when fundamental rights are at issue, defers
to the military’s assertion of the need for good order and discipline.
Parker v. Levy, decided in 1974, is probably the most significant
military-deference case because it outlines the reasoning behind the
Court’s “separate society” doctrine.101 Levy was an Army doctor who,
after a court martial, was convicted and sentenced to three years im-
prisonment for telling soldiers that Vietnam was a war that took a
disproportionate number of black soldiers.102 In writing for the major-
ity and upholding the conviction, Justice Rehnquist concluded: “[t]his
Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a spe-
cialized society separate from civilian society.”103 Military personnel
would not be afforded full First Amendment rights.
The Parker v. Levy separate-from-society doctrine became more
entrenched through later Supreme Court decisions. Again writing
for the majority in 1981, in Rostker v. Goldberg, finding that Congress
had the right to exclude women from draft registration, Justice
97. Id.
98. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
100. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
101. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743–53 (1974).
102. Id. at 735–37.
103. Id. at 743.
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Rehnquist cited with approval the Congressional testimony of Gen-
eral Bernard Rogers:
One thing which is often lost sight of, Senator, is that in an emer-
gency during war, the Army has often had to reach back into the
support base . . . and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks in an
emergency; that is, to hand them a rifle or give them a tanker suit
and put them in the front ranks . . . . Now, if that support base
and that operating base to the rear consists [sic] in large measure
of women, then we don’t have that opportunity to reach back and
pull them forward, because women should not be placed in a for-
ward fighting position or in a tank, in my opinion. So that, too,
enters the equation when one considers the subject of the utility
of women under contingency conditions.104
In light of an approach like that of General Rogers’ from 1979, women
today are still excluded from thirty-four percent of the Army’s autho-
rized positions.105 The 2013 Pentagon policy should reduce this percen-
tage, but the extent of the reduction is unclear given that the policy
provides for female exclusion if the military makes a sufficient fac-
tual showing.106 A formal, de jure exclusion rate of thirty-four percent
based on any characteristic—race, sex, gender, sexual orientation,
religion, or even non-protected classifications—would seem irrational
and unacceptable elsewhere in American society. But, that might be
exactly the point, because, according to Justice Rehnquist, the mili-
tary is a separate society.
Outside the military, the demise of de jure sex and gender discrim-
ination was assured with the Supreme Court’s decision in Frontiero
v. Richardson, in 1973.107 Frontiero was a case arising from a military
policy that provided automatic benefits to the wives of male soldiers
but not to the husbands of female soldiers.108 Although a plurality of
the Court believed that gender-based discrimination should be exam-
ined with strict scrutiny, the Court in Frontiero decided to review gen-
der cases under an “intermediate scrutiny” standard, which it further
addressed in Craig v. Boren,109 and which ultimately developed into
the exceedingly persuasive standard the Court announced in United
States v. Virginia (VMI ).110 In Frontiero, the Court found that
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-
gence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
104. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 55, 82–83 n.17 (1981).
105. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2.
106. Roulo, supra note 10.
107. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
108. Id. at 680.
109. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
110. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a
result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to in-
ferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its
individual members.111
The solider in Frontiero prevailed because the military could not
justify discriminating for administrative ease (presuming that the
husbands of female soldiers were less dependent than the wives of
male soldiers).112
II. THE COMBAT-EXCLUSION OF WOMAN SOLDIERS
There is probably some truth behind the reasons why the military
excluded male spouses of female soldiers from the automatic receipt
of benefits in Frontiero and the exclusion of women soldiers from com-
bat today.113 That is, male spouses of female soldiers probably needed
benefits less frequently than female spouses of male soldiers, and, gen-
erally, women soldiers are not as physically strong as male soldiers.114
But, in the case of the combat exclusion policy, it does not seem re-
motely possible that administrative ease could be the military’s real
reason for excluding half the population from combat. The combat ex-
clusion seems based more on social and cultural remnants than on a
merit-based determination of an individual soldier’s combat readiness.
Surely, if it wanted to fully utilize women as a resource, as well
as increase its combat capability overall, the military could have cre-
ated a test for all male and female soldiers to determine each soldier’s
fitness for combat. Even if it did not want to test any male soldiers be-
cause it presumed every one of them was fit for combat, which seems
impossible, the military could have created a combat fitness test for
only women. Moreover, even if its rationale were that it did not want
to use additional resources for a new combat readiness test (“admin-
istrative ease”), the military could have used the basic Army physical
fitness test, which all males and females take currently, as the only
criterion to determine combat fitness.115 The military could simply de-
termine that a certain minimum score—the same minimum for male
and female soldiers—is required to be eligible for combat. Even if it re-
sisted full combat inclusion for women on the grounds that it would
111. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
112. Id. at 690.
113. Id. at 681–82.
114. See id.
115. APFT Standards, supra note 64.
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have to devise a costly new combat-readiness test, the military’s
exclusion would still be based on gender and, if tested in the courts,
the exclusion would have to be justified by an exceedingly persua-
sive government interest.116 The Supreme Court rejected this kind
of administrative-ease rationale in Frontiero.
The irony is that the end of the combat exclusion policy for
women would be that the soldiers in combat units would be the most
physically strong overall in the military. But, trying to determine what
constitutes “physically strong” is a hazardous endeavor. Almost cer-
tainly, on every American football team, the quarterback, the most
important and highest paid player, is far weaker physically than line-
men who weigh a hundred pounds more.117 The linemen’s arms can
lift more weight than the quarterback’s arms.118 Similarly, the legs of
the football team’s fleet ball carriers and pass receivers allow them
to run much faster than the quarterback.119 But, not one football team
would win a game having its “strongest” player serve as quarterback.
Obviously, “strength” embodies far more than brute physical attrib-
utes and includes mental and emotional ability.
Aside from strength considerations, or the average woman’s lesser
strength when compared with men, the military’s combat-exclusion
policy for women is based, at least facially, on two other primary
reasons—the need for “privacy” for soldiers and “berthing” consider-
ations, according to the 2012 Pentagon policy.120 In its Report on com-
bat restrictions for women, the Pentagon argued that many older
ships, for example, did not provide adequate sleeping quarters for
women.121 The obvious response is that, if this is the case, and if sep-
arate sleeping quarters is a military necessity, and even if everyone
wants separate sleeping quarters for men and women and everyone
agrees that the military should not spend money retrofitting ships
for women’s quarters, women should simply not serve on those ships.
But the lack of female quarters on some ships is not a reason to pro-
hibit all women from serving in all combat units.
The female soldier in Frontiero had a relatively strong case be-
cause both she and her civilian husband suffered discrimination based
on the military’s rationale of administrative ease, a relatively weak
116. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996).
117. See generally Austin Reinsch, QB Pressure: Defensive Lineman Vs. Linebackers,
BLEACHERREPORT.COM (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/323396
-qb-pressure-defensive-linemen-vs-linebackers (“[L]inemen are usually bigger and stronger
than the rest of the team.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i–ii.
121. Id. at 12.
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basis for discrimination.122 The policy mandated that dependents’
benefits would be automatically provided to wives of male soldiers but
not to husbands of female soldiers.123 In Frontiero, there was no ques-
tion about the strength or merit of an individual person, a determi-
nation that can be discretionary or arbitrary. A different situation is
presented in the military’s combat exclusion policy.124 This discrimi-
nation is based on an individual’s characteristic (gender as a proxy
for strength), and it occurs among the same subset of people, that is,
among all soldiers, as opposed to also a civilian spouse in Frontiero.125
Within its “separate society,” as Justice Rehnquist termed it in
Parker v. Levy, the military has allowed discrimination against black,
homosexual, and female soldiers so as to respect the sensitivities of
other soldiers and thus make a stronger fighting force.126 The irony
in this argument is that in the 1950s, individuals within civil society
obtained greater individual rights.127 By the end of the 1970s, most
de jure discrimination in civil society had been held unconstitutional
or eliminated, and was almost completely eliminated by the Court’s
decision in VMI, in 1996.128 In contrast, by the end of the 1980s, U.S.
soldiers possessed fewer constitutional rights than they had pos-
sessed in the 1950s.129 Moreover, the 2012 Pentagon policy further
entrenched the combat-exclusion policy for women, before the policy
was relaxed in 2013.130
In the 1950s, the military tried to extend its reach into civilian
society.131 But it lost the case that would have provided it with almost
complete control over all people who have significant contact with the
military. In Reid v. Covert, decided by the Supreme Court in 1957, the
Army convicted two civilian wives of murder for killing their hus-
bands, who had been soldiers when they died.132 Through treaties, the
122. The “soldier” in Frontiero was a lieutenant in the Air Force. Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
123. Id.
124. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (holding that classi-
fications based on sex violate the due process clause if they are implemented solely for
administrative ease), with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76–77 (1981) (“Women as a
group, however, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat.”).
125. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 792.
126. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
127. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
128. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
129. See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (discussing the changes in
soldiers’ constitutional rights made by the President and Congress in the late 1970s).
130. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at i; Roulo, supra
note 10.
131. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3, 4 (1957) (discussing military attempts
to subject civilians to trial by military tribunals instead of civilian courts).
132. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3–4.
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United Kingdom and Japan, where the killings occurred, had agreed
previously that they would waive jurisdiction over such cases and
permit the U.S. military to intercede and prosecute.133 However, find-
ing that civilians had Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections greater
than those possessed by soldiers and what the civilian wives received
in their military trials, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions
of the wives.134 However, aside from concluding that civilians cannot
be tried in a military court martial, the Court implicitly concluded that
Congress may create a military justice system that does not contain
a full menu of constitutional rights for soldiers.135
In later cases, relying on Congressional and Executive authority
in Articles I and II of the Constitution, the Supreme Court carved
out the separate-society doctrine that is now the primary legal jus-
tification preventing Equal Protection claims within the military, or
making them difficult to sustain. In a 1968 decision in a criminal
case involving a defendant on the periphery of the military, United
States v. O’Brien, the Court rejected a First Amendment claim and
affirmed a civilian defendant’s conviction for burning his draft card.136
In 1974, in Parker v. Levy, the Court rejected an Army captain’s First
Amendment claim that he had a right to tell soldiers the Vietnam
War was wrong.137 In Greer v. Spock, in 1976, the Court approved the
removal of civilian protesters from a public road that ran through a
military base.138 In 1980, in Brown v. Glines, the Court rejected the
First Amendment claim of a soldier who wanted to collect signatures
for a petition objecting to military grooming standards.139 In 1981, in
upholding male-only draft registration in Rostker v. Goldberg, the
Court rejected a male registrant’s Equal Protection claim.140 In 1987,
in Solorio v. United States,141 the Court found that the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) applied to soldiers at all times, thereby
overruling a 1969 case, O’Callahan v. Parker, in which the Court had
held that the military could exert personal jurisdiction over a soldier
only in regard to the soldier’s service-related activity.142 Finally, in
1986, in Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court rejected a Free Exercise
claim by an officer who wanted to wear a yarmulke while on duty.143
133. Id. at 15–16.
134. Id. at 49.
135. See id. at 1–4.
136. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968).
137. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 733 (1974).
138. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 828 (1976).
139. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349 (1980).
140. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981).
141. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
142. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969).
143. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
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While civilian society has obtained far greater civil liberties over the
past sixty years, soldiers within the U.S. military have seen their
civil liberties vastly diminished.
III. THE BOUNDARY OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
TOWARD THE MILITARY
Under traditional constitutional analysis, before the government
can curb a fundamental right, such as Free Expression or Free Exer-
cise under the First Amendment, the government must have a compel-
ling interest and a narrowly tailored means to achieve the interest.144
The Supreme Court’s military cases do not apply this test.145 Instead,
the Court almost always defers to the military’s assertion of what
is necessary and has allowed virtually any restriction on a soldier’s
civil liberty.146 One commentator concluded that the Court’s deference
is recent and unfounded:
[J]udicial deference to the military, at least as the principle is
understood in contemporary decisions of the Court, is surpris-
ingly recent and not at all constitutionally established. In fact,
this deference departs from constitutional text and from a line
of Supreme Court precedent concerning civilian-military relations
extending back before the Civil War. Broad judicial deference to
military discretion is only a creation of the post-Vietnam, all-
volunteer military and, more specifically, only a creation of one
single Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist [who
authored the majority opinions in Rostker, Levy, and Solorio].147
The Court has been most restrictive where Free Expression rights
are concerned. In O’Brien and Spock, respectively concerning a civil-
ian who burned his draft card in a public setting far outside a military
base and civilians who protested on a public road inside a military
base, the Court found that administrative needs could be the basis for
inhibiting what would otherwise be expression firmly protected by
the First Amendment.148 In O’Brien and Spock, the speech restrictions
144. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a ‘compelling state interest,’ . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”) (citations omitted).
145. Diane Mazur, Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth of
Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 705 (2002).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 704 (emphasis added).
148. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968); Greer v. Spock 424 U.S. 828,
828 (1976).
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concerned civilians, illustrating that the military is not only free to
regulate behavior inside the military but also civilians’ behavior con-
ducted at the periphery of the military.149
Inside military society, regardless whether in combat or during
peacetime, the Supreme Court provided almost no room for an in-
dividual soldier’s Free Expression or Free Exercise claims. In Parker
v. Levy, from 1974, Brown v. Glines, from 1980, and Goldman v.
Weinberger, from 1986, the Court found that a military doctor’s right
to speak about the Vietnam War, a soldier’s right to circulate petitions,
and an officer’s right to wear a yarmulke had to be subordinated to
the military’s claim of the need for good order and discipline.150 The
Court did not require the military in even one case, whether involv-
ing soldiers or civilians, to provide empirical evidence to support its
claims that the suppression of individual rights fostered good order
and discipline within the military.151 The Court has not so much cre-
ated a new standard by which to judge constitutional claims within
the military as it has delegated all constitutional decision-making
solely to the military. In the process, the Court has lessened civilian
control over and civil society’s connection to the military.
Curiously when viewed in a civil rights context, but consistent
with the Court’s deference toward the military, the two most recent
important race and gender Equal Protection cases favoring individ-
uals, Grutter v. Bollinger and United States v. Virginia, are, in part,
grounded in military necessity.152 In sustaining a racial affirmative
action policy at a public university in Grutter as a means to create a
critical learning mass, the Court gave significant credit to the amici
arguments of retired generals.153 The generals indicated that affirma-
tive action is necessary to ensure that the officer corps in the military
reflects the racial composition of enlisted soldiers.154 For the Court
in Grutter, Justice O’Connor credited this reasoning:
[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United
States military [wrote] . . . that . . . “based on [their] decades of
experience,” a “highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . .
is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission
to provide national security.” The primary sources for the Nation’s
149. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 367–69; Spock, 424 U.S. at 831–32.
150. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 733 (1974); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349 (1980);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
151. Id.
152. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308, 331 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996).
153. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308, 331.
154. Id. at 331.
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officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already
admitted to participating colleges and universities. At present,
“the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly
qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and
the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions
policies.” To fulfill its mission, the military “must be selective in
admissions for training and education for the officer corps, and it
must train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps in a racially diverse educational setting.”155
The Court’s reference to the necessity of affirmative action would
normally auger well for females, who comprise only nineteen percent,
thirteen percent, seven percent, and sixteen percent of the military
personnel in the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy, respectively.156
However, looked at more narrowly in regard to the combat-
exclusion rule, the military today, to the extent that it will continue
to limit women in combat, is making an argument that is different
from the affirmative-action arguments that retired generals and
civilian authorities made in Grutter. Rather than supporting affir-
mative action for women in combat positions, the military, in effect,
is arguing that affirmative action should not be used to select combat
soldiers.157 In essence, the retired generals and the government are
arguing that “less qualified” candidates should be admitted to mili-
tary academies to ensure racial diversity in the military. On the other
hand, through the combat-exclusion policy, the military is arguing
that gender diversity should not be a basis on which to admit women
to combat units, even where the women can show that they are more
qualified in combat than particular men.158 Presumably, this argu-
ment will lose steam with the implementation of the 2013 Pentagon
rule, but that rule, nonetheless, permits the exclusion of women from
combat upon a factual showing by the military, the definition of which
is not contained in the rule.159
While retaining the right to limit women in combat under the
2013 rule, the military is claiming that racial affirmative action is ac-
ceptable but that gender affirmative action is not.160 Looked at most
155. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici
Curiae 5).
156. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2.
157. See id. at 15–16 (discussing the removal of gender-restrictive policies but adding
nothing like affirmative action to fix the harm).
158. See Bumiller, supra note 46.
159. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
160. Id.
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favorably from the perspective of the military, banning affirmative
action policies in regard to combat units might be acceptable if combat
is somehow unique or women are poor practitioners of combat arts.
However, female soldiers who want to be in combat units do not argue
for affirmative action, which involves admitting some persons who
might be considered less qualified on some scale to ensure a particular
racial or gender composition.161 The female soldiers are arguing that
they should be permitted to serve in combat units because they are
as qualified as male soldiers.162
The military’s argument for excluding women from combat has
been inconsistent on another level. In arguing for racial affirmative
action in Grutter, the generals knew that individual law students,
whose race the university took into consideration in the admissions
decision, had lower test scores and grades than some white students
who were rejected.163 In contrast, the military’s combat-exclusion
policy is based on an accurate presumption that generally women
are not as physically strong as men.164 Perhaps this does not rise to
the level of the objectionable stereotyping (delaying the promotion
of women to partner) in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins because the
proposition about strength seems to be generally accurate.165 But
the military’s focus on strength is too narrow and limited. The focus
on average strength as a basis for discrimination is the same as the
discredited height and weight requirements that police and fire de-
partments used previously to hire police officers and firefighters, often
to the exclusion of women.166 Moreover, unlike the generals’ knowledge
of the “objectively less qualified” law students in Grutter, or objec-
tively less qualified students at military academies, the military has
no idea what individual female soldiers are qualified or unqualified
for combat because it does not permit them to compete for spots in
combat units.167
The military’s exclusion of women from combat has been similar
or identical to Virginia’s exclusion of women from the Virginia Military
Academy. In VMI,168 the military academy did not admit women be-
cause it presumed that they could not succeed as well as men in the
“adversative” method, which features “physical rigor, mental stress,
161. See Bumiller, supra note 46.
162. See Dao, supra note 17.
163. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337–38.
164. See Haring, supra note 23.
165. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
166. For a summary of issues concerning firefighters, see Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct.
2658, 2672–73 (2009).
167. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2, 7.
168. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
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absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regula-
tion of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.”169 Despite
Virginia’s claims that women were not capable of adapting to this
method, the Court, with Justice Ginsberg writing for the majority,
found to the contrary: “Neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers
nor VMI’s implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to
women. And the school’s impressive record in producing leaders has
made admission desirable to some women. Nevertheless, Virginia has
elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and opportu-
nities a VMI education affords.”170
Rejecting VMI’s exclusion of women on Equal Protection grounds,
the Court noted that in the federal military academies women had
graduated at the top of their classes.171 Other than institutionalizing
the exceedingly persuasive standard in Equal Protection gender cases,
the Court in VMI rejected blanket exclusions of women, possibly in
all cases.172
In trying to preserve VMI as an all-male institution, Virginia
proposed the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWMI), a
four-year, state-supported undergraduate program at Mary Baldwin
College, a private liberal arts school for women.173 The Court rejected
this alternative, finding that, compared with VMI, the VWMI experi-
ence provided inferior educational opportunity, and that the prestige
of VMI and opportunities that accompanied it could not be duplicated
at VWMI.174 The combat-exclusion policy for women seems no more
rational or constitutional than the VWMI option for women in the
VMI case. Even the Pentagon’s 2013 policy, eliminating the blanket
exclusion of women from combat, creates a different system for com-
bat inclusion for men and women.175 All men are presumptively fit for
combat. Women are eligible for combat, but they may continue to be
excluded upon an undefined factual basis.
CONCLUSION: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF A
COMBAT-EXCLUSION POLICY FOR WOMEN
The military’s only remaining arguments for excluding women are
that combat is different from all other activity and, procedurally, the
169. Id. at 522 (quoting Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors, Report,
May 16, 1986) (citing United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D.Va. 1991)).
170. Id. at 520.
171. Id. at 545 n.13.
172. See id. at 515 (holding that Virginia failed to show an exceedingly persuasive
justification for excluding women at VMI and that a separate but equal program did not
survive the court’s equal protection evaluation).
173. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526 (1996).
174. Id. at 551–54.
175. Department of Defense, Elimination, supra note 5.
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military should be granted the discretion to make all judgments about
who may participate in combat. It is true that combat is a dangerous
activity, but so are fire fighting and patrolling dangerous neighbor-
hoods in America. Most famously, in California v. Bakke, the Supreme
Court approved affirmative action in medical school admissions.176
Surely, many doctors, especially surgeons or physicians who work
in emergency rooms, face as many and probably more life and death
situations in a career with injured patients as do soldiers in combat.
Affirmative action is as applicable in medical schools as it is in
the military. But, women soldiers who want to participate in combat
are not even arguing for affirmative action. They simply want the
opportunity to prove themselves capable of combat based on a neu-
tral and equal standard. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s military-is-
a-separate-society rationale is obsolete.177 It is a fiction that only male
soldiers participate successfully in combat, as illustrated by female sol-
diers’ widespread participation in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.178
The Court decided United States v. Virginia in 1996 and held that
a military college could not exclude qualified women.179 In 2003, in
Grutter, the Court approved affirmative action, in part, because re-
tired generals claimed it was necessary to support diversity and create
a critical mass of minority students, and thus affirmative action con-
tributed to national security.180 From 2001 to 2012, 140 women were
killed in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.181 Absent the Supreme
Court’s continued willingness to extend the military-is-a-separate-
society rationale from Goldman,182 limiting religious practice in the
military, and Levy,183 limiting free expression in the military, cases
from 26 and 38 years ago, the combat-exclusion policy for women
cannot withstand Equal Protection scrutiny.
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